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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARY ANN MOON, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
STANLEY W. MOON, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
Appeals Ct. No. 970542CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THE APPELLANT, submits the following reply brief to the brief of the appellee. 
1. AS TO APPELLEE5 S STA TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellee in her Statement of the Case under A. Nature of the Case sets forth that the 
trial court had "made clarifications concerning the meaning of income for purposes of calculating 
alimony" at p. 3 of her brief. Part of the argument as presented to this court in appellant's brief is 
that the trial court has in fact made modifications to the Decree of Divorce rather than 
clarifications. If in fact clarification are what are deemed as being made in this matter then the 
Decree of Divorce is ambiguous in its meaning and the only way for the same to be resolved is 
1 
through modifying the document. This would therefore require the filing of a Petition for 
Modification. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
At p. 4 under B. Course of Proceedings of appellee's Brief the appellee fails to inform the 
court that the trial court had also entered an order in conformity with Commissioner Lisa A. Jones 
Minute Entry. The order dismissing the Order to Show Cause is found at R-p.964-968. 
2. AS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Under the Statement of Facts at p. 5 of appellee's brief, appellee sets forth that "the 
respondent then agreed to pay thirty percent (30%) of any additional income over and above 
$150,000" R at 497." This is a misstatement of the testimony and the Decree of Divorce. The 
respondent had in fact agreed to pay thirty percent (30%) of any additional bonuses that he 
received, not any additional income. 
At p. 8 the appellee misstates the findings of the Commissioner. The appellee sets forth 
that the Commissioner had found that the respondent had changed his bonuses to salaries. This is 
incorrect. The Commissioner had found that the "defendant as a shareholder and officer of MST 
Trucking voted, with others, to change the corporate structure of the company." ( R at 959.) 
The Commissioner did not find that he had changed his bonuses to salaries. 
Further at p. 8 under the Statement of Facts the appellee sets forth that the trial court 
"revised the Commissioner's prior ruling dismissing the Order to Show Cause". There was no 
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revision but rather a "rehearing" of a dismissed Order to Show Cause which occurred over the 
objections of appellant's counsel. 
3. AS TO APPELLEE'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Pursuant to the appellee's Summary of Arguments as found at p.9 of appellee's brief the 
appellant does not dispute that Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the judge 
to revise an order before the entry of judgement adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties. It is disputed that the Rule is pertinent in this action. In this case the 
Order to Show Cause was dismissed prior to the filing of the appellee's Petition for Modification. 
(See Order at R 967-968.) 
In \ 2 of the appellee's Summary of Arguments it is for this court to determine whether or 
not Judge Wilkinson "appropriately reinstated" the Order to Show Cause. As previously noted 
this is one of the arguments of the appellant's brief. 
The appellee sets forth in her Summary of Arguments in ^ 2 that the respondent diverted 
income. There was absolutely no testimony or evidence presented that the respondent at any time 
diverted any income in the form of "bonuses" back to salary or any other type of diversion. The 
appellee further sets forth that there is an alternative theory based upon the claim of fraud in this 
matter. There was absolutely no showing of any fraud nor none established nor the same properly 
pled or proven. The trial court did not find fraud and there is no evidence of any fraud in the 
record. 
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In f 3 of the appellee's Summary of Arguments appellee cites the case of Morgan v. 
Morgan. 854 P.2d 559 (Ut.App. 1993). Appellee states that this case stands for the proposition 
that the court may consider K-1 income in dividing assets among parties in a divorce action. In 
Morgan the only discussion of K-1 income is discussed at p. 566 where the K-1 was used to value 
an asset to be distributed between the parties. There is no discussion in Morgan that K-1 
distributions are income but only that that was the means by determining the value of an asset. 
4. AS TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
In appellee's Argument, Point I at pp. 10-11 it sets forth that the respondent had 
converted his bonus to salary. There are no references or citations from the record or transcripts 
by appellee for this proposition because there was no evidence presented or established that the 
respondent had converted his bonuses to salary. 
At p. 11 of the appellee's Brief the appellee sets forth that she waited for the Petition to be 
in front of Judge Wilkinson before raising a Rule 54(b) motion to request that the matter be 
before the court on the Order to Show Cause. This is simply untrue. There is no evidence that a 
Rule 54(b) motion was ever made, requested or sought by the appellee. Appellee can not been 
point to anything in the record for this type of motion ever being raised. The trial court, sua 
sponte, decided that the matter would be heard on either the Order to Show Cause or the Petition 
to Modify, as the court considered them to be "one and the same". As noted from the rulings and 
the arguments as presented in the appellant's Brief the trial court believes that the only difference 
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between an Order to Show Cause and a Petition for Modification is the retro-active effect. The 
trial court has not recognized that there are different burdens of proof and different elements 
between an Order to Show Cause and a Petition to Modify. 
It is disputed between the parties as to whether or not there would be any applicability of 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule itself sets forth that it has to be made 
before the "entry of a final judgement". The intent of the rule is to pertain solely to multiple 
parties and multiple claims not for the single type of claim against individual parties as exist in this 
case. As has been noted to this court in the Brief of the appellant there are different elements and 
burdens of proof between and Order to Show Cause and a Petition for Modification. The denial 
of relief under an Order to Show Cause can be appealed to an appellate court. The adjudication 
of an Order to Show Cause is a final order. In this particular case there was a final adjudication of 
the Order to Show Cause with its dismissal. If the appellee believes that she should have 
prevailed on the Order to Show Cause the appellee was required to file a Notice of Appeal within 
thirty (30) days after the entry of the Order by Judge Wilkinson. (See Rule 4 of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure). This never occurred. To use Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is inappropriate and should not be allowed by this court. The intention of that rule is 
not for the type of actions that were taken by the trial court in trying to adjudicate a matter that 
had already been dismissed. A motion to reconsider is inappropriate and not allowable. Drury v. 
Lunceford. 18 Ut.2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (Ut. 1996) See also Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Ut. 1980) 
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There was no notice of reconsideration and the first time this was raised as to having the 
matter "re-adjudicated" under the Order to Show Cause was when Judge Wilkinson, sua sponte, 
proceeds to say that he is going to adjudicate the matter under both theories of Order to Show 
Cause and the Petition for Modification at the pre-trial which was approximately one-week prior 
to the time of trial on May 23, 1996. 
Point II at p. 19 of appellee's Brief appellee argues that the court should view this matter 
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. There are no references or citations to in the record to 
using this particular claim of equitable estoppel being presented at the trial court. This is because 
equitable estoppel was not argued nor presented to the trial court and the first time for it being 
brought is now before this court. This also applies to the appellee's claim of fraud commencing at 
p. 21 of appellee's Brief. There was no proof or argument of fraud nor was there any findings of 
fraud in this matter by the trial court. The appellee wrongfully argues fraud in her brief. There 
was no evidence of the same nor presentation of the same to the trial court. 
At p.25 of the appellee's Brief an argument for retro-activity appellee states that "retro-
active relief is available if fraud or material misrepresentation or concealment of the financial 
condition is shown to have existed at the time of the Decree of Divorce". Again this was not 
argued at the trial court and there was no evidence of any fraud or material misrepresentation or 
concealment of financial condition. This is the reason why no reference is made to any parts in 
the records of these particular acts because none exist. 
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All of the above arguments of Rule 54(b), equitable estoppel, fraud and retro-activity are 
being asked to be considered when they were not raised or presented at trial. This court has held 
that matters not admitted in evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered on appeal to 
the Court of Appeal. Ebbert v. Ebbert 744 P.2d 1019 (Ut.App. 1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 
1278. All the above arguments should not be allowed by this court. 
In Point III of appellee's Brief at p.27 the appellee again cites the case of Morgan v. 
Morgan. What Morgan stands for as it relates to K-1 income is not the same as is being argued in 
this particular action. The Morgans had property for distribution purposes which used K-1 for the 
valuation of an asset not for the determination of the payment of alimony as is being requested in 
this action. 
In Point IVat p.28 the appellee discusses the attorney's fees. This court in Morgan v. 
Morgan set forth the following: 
"The award, however, must be based upon evidence of the receiving spouses 
financial need for attorneys fees. The ability of the other spouse to pay and the 
reasonableness of the requested award...." 
"Reasonable attorneys fees are not measured by what an attorney actually bills, nor 
is the number of hours spent on the case determinative in computing these. In 
determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees, '...[a] court may consider, among 
other factors the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in 
representing the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, 
the fee customarily charged in locality for similar services, the amounts involved in 
the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved.'" IdL at 568, 569, quoting Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d at 1336. 
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In this case there was no evidence presented of any of these factors in determining the attorneys 
fees that were requested by appellee's counsel Appellee's counsel was only able to give a total 
figure for what he billed and what Mr Fankhauser charged There was no showing that what he 
did was appropriate or reasonable. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The appellee's arguments relating to Rule 54(b), equitable estoppel, fraud and retro-
activity being first raised on appeal should be summarily dismissed by this court The relief as 
requested by appellant in his Brief is appropriate and should be granted by this court 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Lf> day of July, 1998 
RANIf)Y S LUDLOW 
Attorhey for Respondent/Appellant 
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